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This special issue of Studia Logica contains a selection of papers presented
at the 12th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision
Theory (LOFT12), which took place in Maastricht (The Netherlands), July
20-22, 2016. While this special issue collects papers which are more focused
on logic, a second set of papers—that have a more game-theoretic content—
can be found in a special issue of the B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
The LOFT conferences have spanned a period of 22 years: the ﬁrst took
place in 1994 in Marseille (France) and, since then, LOFT has become a
regular bi-annual event.1
The LOFT conferences are interdisciplinary events that bring together
researchers from a variety of ﬁelds: cognitive psychology, computer science
and artiﬁcial intelligence, economics, game theory, linguistics, logic, mind
sciences, philosophy and social choice. In its original conception, LOFT had
as its central theme the application of logic, in particular modal epistemic
logic, to foundational issues in the theory of games and individual decision-
making. The LOFT initiative arose from the realization that the tools and
methodology that were used in game theory were closely related to those
used in other ﬁelds, notably computer science, logic and philosophy. Modal
logic turned out to be the common language that made it possible to bring
together diﬀerent professional communities.
New and active areas of research have sprung from the interdisciplinary
exposure provided by the LOFT events. Over time the scope of the LOFT
1 The first conference was hosted by the Centre International de Recherches Math-
ematiques in Marseille (France), the next four took place at the International Centre
for Economic Research in Torino (Italy), LOFT6 was hosted by the Graduate School of
Management in Leipzig (Germany), LOFT7 took place at the University of Liverpool
(United Kingdom), LOFT8 at the University of Amsterdam (The Netherlands), LOFT9
at the University of Toulouse (France), LOFT10 at the University of Sevilla (Spain) and
LOFT11 at the University of Bergen (Norway).
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conferences has broadened to encompass a wider range of topics, while main-
taining its focus on the general issue of rationality and agency. Topics that
have fallen within the LOFT umbrella include epistemic and temporal logic,
theories of information processing and belief revision, models of bounded
rationality, non-monotonic reasoning, theories of learning and evolution,
social choice theory, the theory of social networks, etc. A complete list of
publications that have sprung from the past LOFT conferences is given in
the References section at the end of this Introduction.
This special section consists of four articles, which are brieﬂy summarized
below.
The paper “The dynamics of epistemic attitudes in resource-bounded
agents” by Philippe Balbiani, David Fernandez Duque and Emiliano Lorini
presents some logics for reasoning about the formation of beliefs through
perception or through inference in non-omniscient resource-bounded agents.
The logic distinguishes the concept of explicit belief from the concept of
background knowledge. This distinction is reﬂected in its formal seman-
tics and axiomatics, by using a non-standard semantics putting together
a neighbourhood semantics for explicit beliefs and relational semantics for
background knowledge, and by allowing for speciﬁc axioms in the logic high-
lighting the relationship between the two concepts. Mental operations of
perceptive type and inferential type, having eﬀects on epistemic states of
agents, are primitives in the object language of the logic. At the semantic
level, they are modelled as special kinds of model-update operations, in the
style of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. The paper presents results on axiomati-
sation, decidability and complexity for the logics.
In the paper “Dynamic epistemic logic of diﬀusion and prediction in social
networks”, Alexandru Baltag, Zoe´ Christoﬀ, Rasmus Kraemmer Rendsvig
and Sonja Smets present a logical approach to threshold models, used to
study diﬀusion (of opinions, new technologies, infections, or behaviour) in
social networks. Threshold models consist of a network graph of agents con-
nected by a social relationship and a threshold value which regulates the
diﬀusion process. Such models formalise the intuition that an individual’s
actions or opinions are inﬂuenced by the individuals around them. In the
model, agents adopt a new behavior/product/opinion when the proportion
of their neighbours who have already adopted it meets the threshold. Under
this adoption policy, threshold models develop dynamically towards a guar-
anteed ﬁxed point. The paper has two goals, the ﬁrst of which is to propose
logics for reasoning about threshold models and their dynamics. For this,
the authors construct a minimal dynamic propositional logic to describe
the threshold dynamics and show that the logic is sound and complete.
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The second goal is to investigate how the agents’ knowledge aﬀects such
dynamics. For this, the framework is extended with an epistemic dimension
and the authors investigate how information about more distant neighbours’
behaviour allows agents to anticipate changes in behaviour of their closer
neighbours.
As the title suggests, in “Logics for moderate belief-disagreement between
agents” Jia Chen and Tianqun Pan study the idea of moderate belief-
disagreement from a logical perspective. Moderate disagreement means that
some agent believes a certain proposition whereas another agent does not.
It must be distinguished from strong disagreement, which is a situation
where the ﬁrst agent believes the proposition and the second agent believes
its negation, and also from weak disagreement, which means that the ﬁrst
agent does not believe the proposition and the second agent does not believe
its negation. The authors develop two logical systems for moderate belief-
disagreement, and show that the ﬁrst is sound and complete with respect to
arbitrary frames, and that the second is sound and complete with respect
to serial frames. At the end, the ﬁndings in the paper are compared to
Aumann’s famous paper on “agreeing to disagree”.
In the paper “The monodic fragment of Propositional Term Modal
Logic”, R. Ramanujam and Anantha Padmanabha develop a logic related
to Term Modal Logics (TML)—introduced by Fitting, Thalmann and
Voronkov (2001)—in which modalities are indexed by terms, built on a
generic ﬁrst-order logic. The authors call their logic Propositional Term
Modal Logic (PTML). While TML can be used to quantify over the set
of agents, PTML is suitable for reasoning about systems of unboundedly
many reasoners. The main problem investigated by the authors is decidabil-
ity. They study the monodic fragment of propositional TML (the monodic
fragment of a quantiﬁed logic is a syntactic restriction where one allows
at most one free variable in the scope of any modal formula) and give a
non-deterministic double exponential time algorithm to decide its satisﬁa-
bility problem. The authors also provide an invariance characterisation of a
particular notion of bisimulation introduced here for the logic PTML.
The editors of the special issue would like to thank the authors for their
submissions, the LOFT participants for their lively discussions and the many
reviewers for their invaluable help during the thorough reviewing and edito-
rial process. Last but not least, our thanks go to Jacek Malinowski, Editor-
in-Chief of Studia Logica, for making this special issue possible.
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